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THE DOCTRINE OF MULTIPLE PROSECUTION IN TEXAS
by
Walter W. Steele, Jr.*
T HE LAW and procedure of sentencing, as a step in the administration
of criminal justice, is currently receiving a great deal of attention and
reformative effort. Aspects of plea bargaining, pre-sentence information,
sentencing uniformity, and right to counsel at sentencing are all under
scrutiny. The doctrine of multiple prosecution, however, continues to be
largely ignored, although it too is a part of any comprehensive sentencing
scheme. If it can be said that the philosophy of sentencing procedures is to
balance the harm done society and the consideration due the individual of-
fender as a human being, then the doctrine of multiple prosecution should
strike the same balance. Indeed, the premise of "making the punishment fit
the crime" is sympathetic to "one crime, one punishment." The law of
multiple prosecution is of further interest because it constitutes one of the
few remaining phases of criminal law and procedure uncontrolled by deci-
sions applying federal constitutional doctrine. In fact, the doctrine of
multiple prosecution is so faintly understood that even its nominative,
"double jeopardy," is a misnomer, as shall be demonstrated in this paper.
Special emphasis will be given herein to Texas law and practice. This is
not to say that Texas jurisprudence is model; in fact it is a classic example
of the confusion and overlapping which typifies all of the law of multiple
prosecution.
I. HISTORY OF THE JEOPARDY PRrNCIPLE
"Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for
the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in Western Civilization,"
stated Justice Black in his Bartkus v. Illinois dissent As a general proposi-
tion the maxim of one crime, one punishment, may be traced as far back
as the Greeks and Romans; however, the origins of the doctrine as a spe-
cifically applied procedural principle are not as distinct.!
Apparently, the First Congress gave little thought to the double jeo-
pardy clause of the fifth amendment,' simply observing that it was in-
tended to be "declaratory of the law as it now stood" and was to conform
to the "universal practice in Great Britain and in this country."' In retro-
spect the approach of the First Congress seems rather cavalier when one
considers that there was no mention of double jeopardy in the Magna Carta
and that the doctrine was not contained in English statute law at the time
the Constitution was adopted.' In fact Yearbook period defendants were
* LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Lecturer, Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
5359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959).
'Sigler, A History of Double jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283 (1963).
s U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (Gates & Seaton ed. 1834); Note, Double Jeopardy: A Problem
Under Dual Sovereignty, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 521 (1958).
' Sigler, supra note 2, at 287.
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often placed in multiple jeopardy in England.'
One of the earliest English cases to recognize a defendant's right to be
free from multiple prosecution was Vaux's Case, decided in 1591.' Three
years later Sir Edward Coke became Attorney General and gave the doc-
trine the substance described by the First Congress So successful was Coke
in postulating the jeopardy principle that only one hundred years later
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, stated: "First, the plea of autrefois acquit,
or former acquittal, is grounded on the universal maxim of the common
law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life
more than once for the same offense."'
The American history of double jeopardy began with the Body of Lib-
erties of 1641, a document applying in the Massachusetts Colony, which
stated: "no man shall be twice sentenced by civil Justice for one and the
same Crime, Offence, or Trespasse."'' Furthermore, in Massachusetts every
criminal action was required to be entered "in the rolls of everie court that
such Actions be not afterwards brought again to the vexation of any
man."" Nevertheless, only one state, New Hampshire, put a double jeo-
pardy clause into its Constitution during the Colonial period. After the
United States Constitution was ratified, the attention of the new republic
focused on strengthening the individual's protection from governmental
authority. The result was the Bill of Rights, and it was James Madison who
sponsored the double jeopardy concept as it was finally incorporated into
the fifth amendment." Certainly, Madison cannot be criticized for the con-
fused position of today's courts in applying the double jeopardy principle.
Double jeopardy operates somewhere between substantive and procedural
criminal law and is therefore dependent upon their development. The First
Congress merely did the best they could with the undeveloped body of
knowledge available to them at the time.
Since colonial days, the federal and state concepts of multiple prosecu-
tion have developed independently. Whatever single-line development
might have been achieved through controlling federal precedent was nipped
by the Supreme Court's refusal to impose a constitutional standard on state
application of the jeopardy principle. In Palko v. Connecticut " the Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
make the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment" applicable to
the states. Palko was indicted for first degree murder, convicted of second
degree, and sentenced to life. The state appealed and won a reversal, where-
upon Palko was retried on the same indictment, convicted of first degree
'Kirk, Jeopardy During the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602 (1934).
'.4 Co. Rep. 44(a), 76 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1591).
'Sigler, supra note 2, at 294.
94 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
'
0
M. FARRAND, THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 46 (1929).
"'Id. at 47.
"N.H. CoNsT. art. T, § VXI (1784).
'a 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1834). S. JOUR., 1st Cong., Ist Sess. 105,
119, 130 (1789).
14302 U.S. 319 (1937).
ia "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb," U.S. CONST. amend, V.
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murder, and sentenced to death. Despite the harsh circumstances, the Court
concluded that there was no violation of "fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu-
tions."'"
Since the Palko opinion in 1937, the Supreme Court has consistently re-
fused to reverse any state conviction on the grounds that fifth amendment
principles of jeopardy are applicable. However, a recent Supreme Court de-
cision indicates a possible change in the Court's view of double jeopardy.
In Cichos v. Indiana" the Court was squarely presented with the question
of the applicability of the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amend-
ment to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although the Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted,
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Fortas and
Douglas, specifically approved the fifth amendment doctrine of jeopardy
being made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, in a 1965 case, United States v. Wilkins," the Second Circuit
concluded that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does
impose some limitation on the power of the state to re-prosecute an indi-
vidual for the same crime. Although the Wilkins opinion does not override
Palko, it is interesting to note that the facts of the two cases are almost
identical. 9 Surely, the Supreme Court eventually will reverse its stand.
Should the Court refuse to do so, the scope of the eighth amendment pro-
tection against cruel and unusual punishment invites speculation.
II. PATTERNS OF MULTIPLE PROSECUTION
A. Res Judicata as a Jeopardy Doctrine
This commentary is concerned with criminal procedure; thus the intri-
cacies of res judicata and its cousin, collateral estoppel, will not be dis-
cussed.' Suffice it to say that the comprehensive common law doctrine of a
single trial being permanently determinative of a single issue has some rele-
vance to the problem of multiple prosecution."
To start at the beginning, Blackstone had this comment: "It is to be ob-
served, that the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, or a former
acquittal, and former conviction, must be upon a prosecution for the same
identical act and crime."22 It is impossible to know if Blackstone actually
intended his "and" in the conjunctive sense. If so, he called for a very
limited application of jeopardy which is not followed today, for the dis-
e302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
" 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
"348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965). The opinion contains an excellent analysis of the Supreme
Court cases which had previously dealt with constitutional limitations upon state multiple prosecu-
tion.
" In United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), there were three successive
prosecutions; Palko had only two.
20 See Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1960); Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions,
19 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1966).
21 Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79
(1937); see Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REi. 317 (1954).
224 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *336 (emphasis added).
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tinction between identity of act and identity of crime is determinative of
several conflicting philosophies of double jeopardy.
The federal courts have been fairly uniform in applying identity of act
(facts) as the determinative factor. This principle was established as early
as 1886 in Coffey v. United States," where the Supreme Court held that
since the defendant had been found innocent of illegally operating a still in
an earlier criminal trial, the facts of the same alleged act could not be used
by the government in a later civil proceeding for forfeiture of the still
equipment. To highlight the decision, the Court stated that the difference
in burden of proof, viz., "beyond reasonable doubt" versus "preponder-
ance of proof," was not significant. The Coffey principle was later enunci-
ated as: "[A] question of fact or law distinctly put in issue and directly
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be dis-
puted by the same parties. The principle is as applicable to the decisions of
criminal courts as to those of civil jurisdiction." '4 While some states follow
the federal approach, others ignore acts or quantum of facts and simply
apply identity of crime (penal definition) as the determinant for multiple
prosecution. s
Texas is in a very small minority of states which refuse to apply the doc-
trine of res judicata to criminal cases." The rationale given is that the leg-
islature intended, through what is now article 27.05 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure," to exclude res judicata as a plea because the doctrine was
not specifically mentioned in that statute, while the specified defenses of
autrefois convict and autrefois acquit were included." Perhaps the Texas
solution is advisable. Res judicata depends upon identity of something-
acts or substantive crimes. It is impossible to identify what facts have ac-
tually been determined in a criminal trial, because the defendant is allowed
a general plea of not guilty and is not forced to plead specifically to each
element of the offense." Furthermore, the defendant may raise affirmative
defenses under his general plea, and the jury may return a general verdict
without specifying what issues were resolved in their decision.'
B. Former Acquittal Versus Former Conviction
Clearly the doctrines of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict demand a
"a 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
24 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915); cf. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938). The federal courts have found res judicata identity of acts or facts in separate prosecu-
tions involving: "attempt to evade," United States v. Rachmill, 270 F. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
"guilty knowledge," United States v. McConnell, 10 F.2d 977 (E.D. Pa. 1926); and "possession,"
Yawn v. United States, 244 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1957); see also Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F.2d
693 (5th Cir. 1944).
'State v. Phillips, 171 Wash. 607, 38 P.2d 372 (1934), and cases cited therein.
"'Spannel v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918). But see Anderson v. State, 24
Tex. Crim. 705, 7 S.W. 40 (1886).
"TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.15 (1967).
" Spannel v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 432, 203 S.W. 357, 363 (1918). The reasoning in
Spannel is inconsistent with the fact that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.05 (1967) also
fails to mention the defense of former jeopardy, and yet that defense has always been well recog-
nized in Texas.2
'TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 27.02 (1965).
30Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); Curtis v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 227, 3 S.W.
86 (1886).
[ Vol. 2 2
MULTIPLE PROSECUTION
final judgment of either acquittal or conviction."a Although it seems that
the doctrines are rather well defined, as is true in other areas of the law,
their application leads to confusion." As early as 1880 the Texas courts
had made a classic statement defining the principles: "Autrefois acquit is
only available in cases where the transaction is the same and the two indict-
ments are susceptible of, and must be sustained by, the same proof. These
two elements must combine and both are sine qua non to the sufficiency of
the plea. Autrefois convict only requires that the transaction, or the facts
constituting it be the same."as
Autrefois acquit is a proper procedural application of the general dem-
ocratic doctrine of one crime, one punishment. Suppose, during one crim-
inal escapade, a defendant commits acts amounting to multiple violations
of one penal statute, or single violations of several statutes. If, in trial A,
the defendant is acquitted of offense A, he is not entitled to claim he has
been placed in jeopardy for offense B unless (1) offenses A and B were
committed at the same time, and (2) the facts necessary to establish a con-
viction for offense A are identical to those required to prove offense B. The
second requirement, identity of the evidence, is most significant. In order
for an acquittal in trial A to protect a defendant in trial B, the evidence
must be the same. The fact that the evidence might be the same at both
trials will not support a plea of autrefois acquit. Principles of res gestae are
involved. For instance, if the defendant steals the cattle of A and B at the
same time, and at trial A res gestae evidence of the B theft is introduced,
acquittal at trial A does not bar trial B. The evidence was not bound to be
identical for both crimes; it merely happened to be so because of the ap-
plication of res gestae.'
The rule of autrefois convict, which in theory requires only that the
transaction be the same, is more difficult to apply." Considering the postu-
late-one crime, one punishment-a defendant seemingly should be sus-
ceptible to but one conviction for one crime. However, as social intercourse
has expanded, so has the definition of crime. Now it is quite possible for a
defendant to violate several penal statutes in the commission of a single act
with a single mens rea.' A policy conundrum therefore exists: shall we
1 A question which continues to plague the courts is: acquittal or conviction of what? Note,
Double jeopardy and the Multiple-Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132 (1947).
""Black letter law, specific rules designed to cover the infinite variety of possible human con-
duct, has for centuries invited ignorance of principle by artful construction conforming to the
letter of the law but wholly avoiding it in spirit." Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Ob-
servations, Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 39, 60 (1966).
a Simco v. State, 9 Tex. Ct.. App. R. 338, 348 (1880).
a4Wright v. State, 17 Tex. Crim. 152, 159 (1884): "An accused cannot be acquitted of a
crime with which he has not been charged and tried, and could not be convicted .... . See
Donahoo v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 456, 278 S.W.2d 138 (1955); cf. Adams v. State, 16 Tex. Crim.
162 (1884); Hudson v. State, 9 Tex. Crim. 151 (1880).
' In Texas, this rule is sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of carving," meaning that the
prosecution can carve only one conviction from a multi-criminal escapade. Whitten v. State, 94
Tex. Crim. 144, 250 S.W. 165 (1923); Wright v. State, 17 Tex. Grim. 152 (1884); Simco v.
State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. R. 338 (1880).
"°Ward v. State, 148 Tex. Grim. 186, 185 S.W.2d 477 (1945) (driving while intoxicated, and
aggravated assault); Young v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 184, 222 S.W. 1103 (1920) (Miranda on
assault, and carrying a pistol); Hopkins v. State, 79 Tex. Grim. 483, 186 S.W. 201 (1916) (same);
Stewart v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 174, 32 S.W. 766 (1895) (rape and incest).
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follow the common law and provide only that a defendant may not be
twice convicted of the identical crime (i.e., identical victim, identical penal
statute, identical evidence); or shall we negate the obvious potential for
prosecutorial harassment and provide some limitation to the number of
convictions allowed for a single criminal transaction? 7
Although the majority of the courts in the United States allow multiple
prosecutions for the same criminal escapade,38 Texas has opted for a broad
concept which affords the most protection to the defendant. 9 Doggett v.
State5 provides an excellent example of the Texas application of autrefois
convict. There, the defendant shot the deceased and robbed him in Calla-
han County, but the deceased died of his wounds in Eastland County.
After the defendant was tried and convicted of robbery in Callahan Coun-
ty, he pleaded autrefois convict at his trial for murder in Eastland County.
On rehearing, the court of criminal appeals sustained the plea and barred
the subsequent murder prosecution. The court distinguished autrefois acquit
and autrefois convict, noting that while autrefois acquit requires that the
multiple crimes arise from the same transaction and be sustained by identi-
cal proof, autrefois convict requires only the former."' Clearly, the proof
required to sustain Doggett's robbery conviction in Callahan County was
not identical with the proof of the murder in Eastland County, but the
transaction was the same. However, the potential for multitudinal confu-
sion arising from attempts to define a criminal "transaction" is obvious.
The statutory fractionalization of crime, often declared to be malum
prohibitum, makes a solution to the problem of multiple prosecution for a
single criminal escapade imperative. The role played by autrefois acquit is
the least troublesome. Properly understood and applied, it is self-enacting
and requires very little discretion. The vagueness of "same transaction" is
quickly reduced to jural certainty by the additional requirement of identi-
cal proof. Autrefois convict, on the other hand, is susceptible to judicial
death because of the impossibility of defining a single criminal transaction.
Additionally, at least in Texas, there is a doctrine called "carving," which
is easier of application than autrefois acquit or convict. This doctrine places
the burden on the prosecutor to carve but once, forcing him to make the
initial decision as to transaction with the right to second guess left to the
courts.
The courts' applications of "same transaction" to the autrefois acquit
and convict rules are inconsistent and confused.' Much of the confusion
results from failure to grasp the fact that "identity of proof" is not neces-
sary for a plea of autrefois convict. The early Texas case of Thomas v.
State' is an example. At his trial for assault to murder, the defendant plead-
""U.S. CONSTr. amend. V does not provide a limitation. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386
(1958); neither does the fourteenth amendment. See Hoag v. United States, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
"Note, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 99 (1954).
"Simco v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. R. 338 (1880). "[A] rule, well settled in criminal practice,
which allows the prosecutor to carve as large an offense out of a single transaction as he can, yet
he must cut only once." Id. at 349.
40 130 Tex. Crim. 208, 93 S.W.2d 399 (1936).
41 Id. at 218, 93 S.W.2d at 405.
4' Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1937).
4340 Tex. 36 (1874).
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ed his prior conviction for carrying a pistol, which arose from the same
transaction. The court denied the plea and adopted what it stated to be a
generally accepted rule of common law: that conviction or acquittal of a
minor offense is no bar to prosecution for a greater offense unless the evi-
dential elements of the greater offense include the minor. However, in
Hirshfield v. State," where the issue was whether a prior conviction of
swindling barred prosecution for a forgery arising from the same transac-
tion, the court specifically refused to follow Thomas and held that the
prosecution could "carve" but one conviction out of the entire transaction.
This is an application of the conventional autrefois convict rule. Never-
theless, Hirshfield contains a strong suggestion that the "carving" doctrine
is intended to be something in addition to, and not a part of, autrefois
convict. The court said: "[B]ut it must be borne in mind that there is an-
other principle applicable to this subject of jeopardy which is quite distinct
from that which obtains in pleas of former conviction or acquittal gen-
erally. This is the doctrine of carving .... " In fact, it may be more ap-
propriate to conceptionalize autrefois acquit as one doctrine, and "carving"
as a second doctrine in lieu of autrefois convict.
Unfortunately, the Texas courts have not applied uniformly the doc-
trine of carving in lieu of autrefois convict. In Foster v. State' where the
defendant fired one blast of a shotgun and wounded four men, a convic-
tion for assault to murder one of them was held a bar to further trials
for wounding the other victims. In Lillie v. State7 several shots were fired
and there were several victims. In this instance the court of criminal ap-
peals reasoned that even though defendant was shooting at his wife, the
shot that killed his child constituted a separate transaction. " Regardless of
appearances, it is to be hoped that liability for multiple prosecutions from
a single transaction does not depend upon how many shots are fired. If so,
defendants are well advised to employ shotguns and bombs and avoid small
caliber pistols.49
Other Texas cases have solved the single transaction-multiple victim
problem by seeking an identity of intention: "The true test in such cases
must be that, if the intent to kill the one is an intention formed and exist-
ing distinct from and independent of the intention to kill the other, the
two acts cannot constitute a single offense.' '"" The element of single intent
44 11 Tex. Grim. 207 (1881).4S1d. at 215.
4 25 Tex. Ct. App. R. 543, 8 S.W. 664 (1888).
4779 Tex. Grim. 615, 187 S.W. 482 (1916).
48 Id. at 616, 187 S.W. at 483; cf. Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Grim. 59, 52 S.W. 77 (1899).
49 Of less philosophical interest is the definitional limitation of a single criminal event or trans-
action. It is impossible to delimit infinite variations of human conduct; ergo, the cases are incon-
sistent. A defendant was held to be amenable to multiple prosecutions for each bet placed in a dice
game. Parks v. State, 57 Tex. Grim. 569, 123 S.W. 1109 (1910); cf. Eproson v. State, 135 Tex.
Grim. 662, 122 S.W.2d 643 (1938). Also, possession of a still and manufacture of the whiskey
have been held separate transactions amenable to multiple prosecutions. Stevenson v. State, 106 Tex.
Grim. 111, 290 S.W. 536 (1927). Federal courts often elect to find more than one transaction,
hence allowing more than one prosecution. Llerandi v. United States, 358 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1966)
(delivery and possession of some counterfeit); Hamilton v. United States, 341 F.2d 914 (5th Cir.
1965) (possession and sale of some whiskey); Perry v. United States, 227 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1955)
(operating an illicit still and making illicit mush).5
.Spannel v. State, 83 Tex. Grim. 418, 420, 203 S.W. 357, 359 (1918).
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has even qualified as the "identical proof" necessary to apply the limited
doctrine of autrefois acquit: "[W]here there is one act, one intent, one vo-
lition, then appellant cannot be convicted upon an act, intent and volition
for which he has been previously acquitted.""
Lawyers may never conclude when a criminal event begins and ends, and
perhaps should not even try. Is either doctrine, "carving" or autrefois con-
vict, sound if it results in one prosecution for a multitude of statutory sins?
Approaches favoring single prosecution in the name of jeopardy make the
price of crime cheaper on a volume basis; this results in sound economics
but inappropriate criminology. Should a man who murders thirty in one
act have no more potential punishment than a man who murders one? Cer-
tainly, administrative sentencing techniques offer sufficient limitations to
possible prosecutorial vindictiveness. Could we not have a type of enhance-
ment of punishment in reverse, so that the multiple offender is liable to
progressively less punishment for each succeeding prosecution arising from
the same transaction? This could be accompanied by liberal rules of joinder
of prosecution at the defendant's option. Such innovations should serve to
discourage the punitive prosecutor while preserving the privilege of the
people to punish.
C. Jeopardy Without Acquittal or Conviction
A question basic to the application of the doctrine of double jeopardy
or multiple prosecution is: when does the first "jeopardy" arise? The com-
mon law recognized only the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit;
"jeopardy" as a word of art was not known."' Initially, it appeared that
Texas would follow the common law and require a final conviction before
jeopardy would attach.53 The Texas Legislature in 1856 declared that
"tno person can be subjected to a second prosecution for the same offense
after having once been . . . duly convicted,"'4 and that there was no pro-
tection of jeopardy arising from a trial where "a jury has been discharged
without rendering a verdict, nor for any cause other than that of a legal
conviction."'
Nevertheless, in Powell v. State" the court refused to follow the legisla-
tive definition. Noting that the interpretation of "jeopardy" was a matter
of constitutional construction for the judiciary, the court held that jeop-
ardy attaches to and protects a defendant when he is put to trial in a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information in sufficient
form to confer jurisdiction, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn."
This is the generally accepted meaning of jeopardy today." Thus, where a
"'Cook v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 182, 183, 63 S.W. 872, 873 (1901); cf. Vasquez v. State,
163 Tex. Crim. 16, 288 S.W.2d 100 (1956).
"Pizano v. State, 20 Tex. Crim. 139 (1886); Interpretative Commentary, TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 14; Comment, Test as to Former Proceeding in Pleas of Former Acquittal, Conviction and
Jeopardy, 17 TEXAS L. REV. 81 (1938).
"Mosely v. State, 33 Tex. 671 (1870).
4 1 W. PASCHAL, LAWS OF TEXAS 476 (3d ed. 1873). (Emphasis added.)
55 Id.
5617 Tex. Ct. App. R. 345 (1884).
"Id. at 350.
"tDownrum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); State v. Laws, 29 Ill. 2d 221, 193 N.E.2d
806 (1963); 21 AM. JL5R. 2D Criminal Law § 175 (1965); Slovenco, The Law on Double Jeopardy,
30 TUL. L. REv. 409 (1956).
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defendant is put to trial on an indictment with substantively defective
averments," as when an impossible date is alleged," the state may dismiss
and retry the defendant. The defendant may have been put to some risk,
but jeopardy did not attach. 1
The Texas approach to jeopardy is unique in one respect-the defendant
is required to enter his plea as a prerequisite to jeopardy attaching to the
proceeding."2 This principle was elucidated in Fann v. State,"5 where the
court observed that "the plea of the defendant is an essential part of the
preliminary proceedings, and until he has pleaded he is not in jeopardy,
though the jury has been sworn to try him." It is submitted that such is a
wise requirement, as the issue is not actually joined until the defendant en-
ters his plea.
"The next question is, the prisoner being in jeopardy, what will deprive
him of the constitutional shield, and relieve the case of jeopardy so that he
can again be placed on trial for the same offense?" 4 An obvious answer is
provided where completion of the trial is prevented by acts of God or sick-
ness of the participants' or where there is a hung jury."6 However, when
the court declares a mistrial on its own motion the question is closer. If
the court discharges the jury and capriciously declares a mistrial, jeopardy
will attach. 7 Whether or not the judge at the first incomplete trial abused
his discretion is said to be a question of fact to be decided at the second
trial." Failure of the defendant personally to consent to the mistrial is a
factor indicating an abusive discretion."
In federal jurisdictions Downum v. United States70 established that, if a
mistrial is necessitated because of a prosecution error, the fifth amendment
requires that jeopardy attach. Thus, a second trial is prohibited, even
though the first trial was incomplete. In Downum the prosecution erred in
not having witnesses available after an announcement of ready. Texas ap-
plied the same rule as early as 1886 in Pizano v. State,7 a case similar to
Downum. However, in Wilson v. State"2 the court held that jeopardy did
not attach to the first trial where the defendant pleaded guilty and the only
reason the trial was not completed was prosecutorial failure to introduce
sufficient corroborating evidence. Similar results have been obtained where
the prosecution, after discovering a misspelled name in an indictment, re-
" Shoemaker v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 518, 126 S.W. 887 (1910).
0
°Spicer v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 57, 179 S.W. 712 (1915).
6' Wilson v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 39, 224 S.W.2d 234 (1949).
62 Steen v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 99, 242 S.W. 1047 (1922); Yerger v. State, 41 S.W. 621 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1897).
63138 Tex. Crim. 580, 137 S.W.2d 1019 (1940).
14 Powell v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. R. 345, 363 (1884).
05 Id.
" Murphy v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 624, 198 S.W.2d 98 (1946).
"
7 Compare TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.29 (1966) with Jones v. State, 148 Tex.
Crim. 374, 187 S.W.2d 400 (1945).
"8Yantis v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 541, 255 S.W. 180 (1923).
"9Chamberlain v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 300, 174 S.W.2d 604 (1943); Hipple v. State, 80
Tex. Crim. 531, 191 S.W. 1150 (1917).
70372 U.S. 734 (1963).
7'20 Tex. Ct. App. R. 139 (1886).
71 154 Tex. Crim. 39, 224 S.W.2d 234 (1949).
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quests a dismissal prior to verdict." All jurisdictions hold that jeopardy
does not attach by reason of a verdict which has been reversed on appeal.
One reason given for this rule is that, by appealing, the defendant waives
his jeopardy privilege; another rationale often cited is that the judgment is
not final when appealed. Texas courts have adopted both philosophies from
case to case.
One may wonder why "jeopardy" should be a word of art. If the pur-
pose of the concept is to protect the defendant from the risk, expense, and
anguish of multiple, abortive attempts to take his liberty, it seems incon-
sistent to deprive him of his constitutional jeopardy shield simply because
the prosecution blunders. Pure application of the jeopardy doctrine dictates
only one exception: where the trial cannot be completed because of un-
controllable circumstances.
D. Repetitive Sentencing
The practice of repetitive sentencing is closely related to multiple prose-
cution. Repetitive sentencing presents two problems, each with independent
considerations. The first arises when a defendant is tried and sentenced, re-
verses his conviction, and is retried and resentenced. Should there be any
coordination between the two sentences, or may the defendant's first sen-
tence be increased at the second trial? The other aspect of repetitive sen-
tencing deals with enhancement. If a sentence for one crime is considered as
a factor to increase a sentence for a second crime, is not the defendant
placed twice in jeopardy for the first crime?
As early as 1919 the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the
attitude that the jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment did not pro-
hibit increasing punishment on a new trial. 5 Later federal cases have justi-
fied this rule on the rationale that when the defendant seeks a new trial, he
impliedly assumes the risk of receiving a higher sentence if the new trial is
granted.' Texas and a majority of the states have consistently followed the
federal approach. However, it is interesting to note that some of the
lower federal courts are beginning to apply fourteenth amendment due
process and equal protection standards to an increase in sentence at de-
fendant's second trial. These cases deny the power to increase the first sen-
tence unless there is a showing of severely amplified probative facts at the
second trial. 8 The application of the fourteenth amendment to protect the
defendant in this instance finds some support in state jurisprudence. At
least three states refuse to allow an increase in the second sentence on the
"
3 Reynolds v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 273, 124 S.W. 931 (1910); Parchman v. State, 2 Tex.
Ct. App. R. 228 (1877).
" Dupree v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 562, 120 S.W. 871 (1909); Sterling v. State, 25 Tex. Crim.
716 (1888); Thompson v. State, 9 Tex. Crim. 649 (1880); Simco v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. R.
338 (1880).
" Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
78 King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938). The rationale suggests that when the
defendant has the new trial forced upon him, he should not be subject to a potentially higher
penalty. See State v. Case, 268 N.C. 330, 150 S.E.2d 509 (1966).
7 Marshall v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 531, 166 S.W. 722, 724 (1914); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex.
Crim. 219, 63 S.W. 1009 (1901).




ground that to do so places an undue burden upon the defendant's right
to appeal."9
The extent of the double jeopardy aspects of enhancing punishment de-
pends entirely upon the definition of "jeopardy." Therefore, a comparison
of the Constitutions of the United States and Texas is quite interesting.
The United States Constitution provides: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' 0 Ar-
guably, this phrase could be interpreted to apply to double prosecution
only. Hence, the jeopardy concept would not interfere with a reformative
policy of enhancement of punishment which dictates that a person who has
previously been punished for one crime, and then commits another, receive
a higher punishment for the second crime than would a first offender. In
contrast to the United States Constitution, the Texas double jeopardy pro-
vision reads: "no person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopar-
dy of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same
offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction.""
Because the drafters of the Texas Constitution were aware of the provisions
of the United States Constitution, their language takes on special mean-
ing. The Texas provision, which seemingly distinguishes between jeopardy
of life or liberty (punishment) and prosecution at trial, could reasonably
be construed to mean that, in Texas, "jeopardy" protects a defendant
against double punishment as well as double prosecution."
The position of the Texas courts on this subject is simple to state, but
difficult to justify. Clearly, the law of Texas is that alleging and proving
prior convictions during the course of a subsequent trial is not a violation
of jeopardy concepts. Such action is said to be only an averment of proba-
tive facts to assist the fact-finder in assessing punishment, and not in any
way an attempt to punish the defendant twice for the same crime."3 For
some incomprehensible reason, however, the jeopardy concept is applied
if the prior conviction is used for enhancement in more than one subse-
quent trial. 4 In Kinney v. State the court said: "Evidently it was never in-
tended that prior offenses could thus be made to do double duty; that is,
that prior cases could be used to enhance the punishment in any given case
more than once. To give the statute such an effect would be violative of
the principle of former jeopardy, which inhibits a defendant from being
convicted more than once for the same offense."'" Consistent with this phil-
"'Sneed v. State, 159 Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895 (1923); People v. Henderson, 35 Cal. Rep. 77,
386 P.2d 677 (1963); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966). See also Whalen, Re-
sentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rav. 239
(1951).
s U.S. CONST. amend. V.
s' TEx. CONST. art. I, § 14 (emphasis added).
" No cases have been found using TEx. CONST. art. I, § 14 as the basis for decision. Further-
more, the interpretive commentary to the Texas Constitution places a different connotation upon
the meaning of the clause.
'Whittle v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 227, 179 S.W.2d 569 (1944).
"4 This reasoning is not applied, however, if the prior conviction is used in successive subsequent
trials for jurisdictional purposes only, viz., misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated
may be used as the basis of a felony driving while intoxicated indictment on two different sub-
sequent offenses. Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93 (1953).
45 Tex. Crim. 500, 501, 79 S.W. 570, 571 (1904).
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osophy, in Sigler v. State"6 it was held that if two prior convictions are al-
leged in prosecution A and the jury convicts, but fails to enhance, the same
two prior convictions may be alleged for enhancement in subsequent pros-
ecution B.
A particular defendant's persistence in committing crime may well merit
progressively increased punishment. It is an obvious desideratum that the
regulator of the punishment be advised of the defendant's previous sen-
tence. Nevertheless, the notion that enhancement punishes the defendant
for his past crimes is difficult to escape.
That the court of criminal appeals has added to this philosophical prob-
lem by introducing the procedural element of jeopardy in the Kinney case
is unfortunate. The Kinney reasoning cannot be defended on the conven-
tional theory that jeopardy applies only to multiple prosecutions and not to
reformative punishment, because the court held that jeopardy did apply
to punishment if the prior conviction was used more than once. If evi-
dence of prior convictions can be used at all, why not more than once?
More particularly, how is the theory of enhancement justified if we en-
hance once, but not progressively so? It is submitted that the protection of
society and reformation of defendants compel the use of all prior convic-
tions in each subsequent prosecution for enhancement.
E. Juvenile Convictions and the Jeopardy Principle
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long been troubled by the
question of jeopardy which arises when a finding of delinquency in ju-
venile court is followed, after the defendant reaches majority, by a trial
related to the same transaction for violation of a penal statute. In this con-
nection Texas development may be chronicled as follows. In 1924 in Van
Hatten v. State" the court, relying on the jeopardy principle, held that a
juvenile declared a delinquent for commission of a felony could not at
adulthood be tried for the same transaction. In 1961 in Hultin v. Stateas
the juvenile defendant assaulted one boy and killed a girl in a single trans-
action. At the delinquency hearing he was charged only with the assault on
the boy, but his counsel wisely placed in evidence the fact that he also mur-
dered the girl, and the defendant was found delinquent on the totality of
the facts. However, when the defendant reached seventeen and was in-
dicted and convicted of the murder of the girl, the court of criminal ap-
peals unequivocally held that jeopardy did not apply because a delinquency
hearing was not a criminal proceeding and hence doctrines of criminal law
did not apply."
The next phase came in 1963 in Garza v. State." Although the facts were
identical with Van Hatten, the court could not reach the same result be-
cause of the Hultin decision. It chose, therefore, to reverse Garza's adult
conviction on the basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
86 143 Tex. Crim. 220, 157 S.W.2d 903 (1942).
"897 Tex. Crim. 123, 260 S.W. 581 (1924).
88
171 Tex. Crim. 420, 351 S.W.2d 248 (1961).
8 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
90369 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
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ment. This was an extraordinarily bizarre holding for the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, because not even the United States Supreme Court has
been willing to apply the fourteenth amendment to this issue.9 The court
has construed Garza very narrowly, however. In Ex parte Sawyer,92 Garza
was distinguished on the tenuous ground that in Garza the defendant ac-
tually pleaded former jeopardy as a defense while in Sawyer he did not, but
rather entered a plea of guilty to the criminal offense."
Apparently the questions are now moot. Recent statutory amendments
provide the juvenile courts with discretion to transfer defendants at age
fifteen or above directly to district courts for trial as adults 4 and clearly
state that no defendant who has been declared a delinquent shall be sub-
sequently prosecuted for any offense alleged in the delinquency petition or
within the knowledge of the juvenile judge at the time of the delinquency
sentence!2
III. PROCEDURE
The procedure for invoking a plea of jeopardy is provided by the Code
of Criminal Procedure, which requires a written motion filed in advance of
trial." The court of criminal appeals has stated that this statutory proce-
dure must be followed, or the plea will be waived." Nevertheless, an impor-
tant exception exists: where the second trial is held in the same court as the
first, the court has judicial knowledge of the prior jeopardy and a formal
motion is unnecessary.9 Another exception to the requirement of formal
pre-trial motion is described in article 37.14 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. If a defendant is tried for a crime which includes within it
lesser offenses and is convicted of one of the lesser offenses, he is automat-
ically acquitted of the higher offense. Therefore, he need not file a formal
motion alleging this acquittal at a subsequent trial."
However the plea may arise, the burden is always on the defendant to
establish former jeopardy by a preponderance of the evidence."' Once the
plea is brought, and evidence submitted, the question of jeopardy becomes a
jury issue. If the jury believes the plea to be true, it so finds and returns;
otherwise it proceeds to the issue of guilt."'
91 Note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
92 386 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
"s In the Sawyer case the court used the words "former jeopardy" and "former conviction"
interchangeably. Actually, they are not the same. See notes 53, 54, 56 supra. As pointed out pre-
viously, the plea of former jeopardy is not even provided in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
See note 28 supra.
94 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, § 4, at 1083, now TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6
(1967).
"STEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6(i) (1967). See Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 475, §
4, at 1086, now TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 30 (1967).
"TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 27.05, 27.06 (1965).
'
7 Hamilton v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 243, 29 S.W.2d 393 (1930); Lee v. State, 66 Tex. Crim.
567, 148 S.W. 567 (1912).
"Black v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 318, 158 S.W.2d 795 (1942). In many instances, of course,
the second trial will in fact be in the same court as the first. Certainly this is likely where multiple
felonies are charged from one escapade.
"TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.14 (1965).
... Robinson v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. 160, 17 S.W. 632 (1886).
... Willis v. State, 24 Tex. Crim. 586, 6 S.W. 857 (1888).
"'Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 213, 355 S.W.2d 516, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 867 (1962);




The procedure requiring the jury to grant or deny the plea of former
jeopardy does not seem in the best interest of the defendant or the state.
No jury can intelligently pass upon such an issue. This abdication of re-
sponsibility further reflects the excessive confusion existing in the law of
multiple prosecution. Article 27.07 should be amended to provide that
pleas of jeopardy be passed upon by the court at the conclusion of the evi-
dence."' A pre-trial ruling would be even more expeditious; however, con-
siderations of identity of the evidence and single versus multiple criminal
transactions make a pre-trial ruling impossible.
IV. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
It is submitted that the Texas statutes attempting to define and imple-
ment the principles of jeopardy are seriously inappropriate. At the outset,
article 1.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is nothing more than a
verbatim copy of the Texas constitutional provision."0 ' Considering the
generality of the language of article 1.10, article 1.11 is seemingly need-
less repetition.' A primary functional void of the Code is the failure to
define the point at which jeopardy arises. The conflicting and uncertain
opinions on this most basic aspect of the problem make statutory defini-
tions mandatory. Certainly all courts would agree that there is no jeopardy
unless the court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, and, in
Texas, that the defendant has entered his plea to the court or jury.
Once jeopardy is clearly defined, the doctrines of former acquittal and
former conviction may be dealt with efficiently. The present statutory
language calling for former acquittal from proceedings "regular or irreg-
ular" merely compounds the complexity.' In this instance the philosophy
of the Model Penal Code"' is most logical-acquittal is clearly defined as a
final judgment on the merits. Additionally, collateral problems of pre-
..a Although no cases have been found suggesting this procedure, it is somewhat analogous to
admission of confessions. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The same problem has been dis-
cussed relative to court versus jury findings on the defense of entrapment. Masciale v. United
States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrels v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
"4'"No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall
a person be again put upon trial for the same offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of
competent jurisdiction." TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 1.10 (1966); TEX. CONST. art. I, S 14.
", "An acquittal of the defendant exempts him from a second trial or a second prosecution for
the same offense, however irregular the proceedings may have been; but if the defendant shall have
been acquitted upon trial in a court having no jurisdiction of the offense, he may be prosecuted
again in a court having jurisdiction." TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 1.11 (1966).
"°Id. See also TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.15 (1966). Ball v. United States, 140
U.S. 118 (1891), on second appeal, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), apparently first announced the doctrine
that a plea of former acquittal is applicable no matter whether the proceedings were regular or
irregular. A, B, and C were charged with murder and jointly tried. A was acquitted, and B and
C were convicted. They appealed and won a reversal because the indictment failed to state an
offense. A, B, and C were re-indicted. A's plea of former acquittal was sustained. The plea of B
and C of former conviction was overruled and they were re-tried and convicted.
107 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is
based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a deter-
mination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of
guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense,
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judgment termination of the trial are well treated in the Model Code."'
Although the listings of the Model Code may seem arbitrary, they supply
a predictable solution to the question of when the jeopardy shield is lost.'
The Texas doctrine of carving but one prosecution from a single trans-
action appears to be both fair and workable. The doctrine should be rec-
ognized by statute, although such legislation would not resolve the debate
as to what is a "single transaction" from which the carving must take place.
However, the presence of the equally vague term "malice" in article 1257b
of the Penal Code". has not deterred prosecutions for murder with malice.
For those cases not covered by carving, viz., where there is in fact more
than one transaction or where there is statutory fractionalization of crimes,
a statute should be adopted limiting the number of separate trials to which
the defendant may be subjected."' If such legislation were adopted, article
27.05 as it now reads would have to be changed."' At the same time, the
situation might be clarified if article 45.32 were repealed because it is mere-
ly repetitive of article 27.0 5.11
Concomitant with the statutory definition of jeopardy and multiple
prosecution is the doctrine of lesser included offenses. The significance of
this doctrine is apparent when article 37.09, article 28.13, and article 37.14
although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information had been
filed or the indictment found, by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which
has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determi-
nation inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for
conviction of the offense.
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the
prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or
vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of
supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter
two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of
the defendant.
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in
this Subsection, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first
witness is sworn but before the verdict. Termination under any of the following
circumstances is not improper:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss
or otherwise, his right to object to the termination.
(b) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary because:
(1) it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with
law; or
(2) there is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judg-
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(3) prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible
to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or
the State; or
(4) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(5) false statements of a juror on voire dire prevent a fair trial.
'0Id. 5 1.08(4).
109 Id.
...TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1257b (1961).
'See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(2), (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
" "The only special pleas which can be heard for the defendant are (1) That he has been
convicted legally, in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the same accusation, after having
been tried upon the merits for the same offense; and (2) That he has been before acquitted of
the accusation against him, in a court of competent jurisdiction, whether the acquittal was regular
or irregular." TEX. CODE CR.IM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.05 (1966) (emphasis added).
"' "The only special plea allowed is that of former acquittal or conviction for the same offense."
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.32 (1966); compare with id. art, 27.05.
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are considered together. ' Texas allows a conviction for a lesser offense if it
is a part of the crime actually charged. ' It becomes mandatory, therefore,
that those crimes which do include lesser offenses be known. Although ar-
ticle 37.09 attempts to delineate some of the crimes which have lesser in-
cluded offenses, the statute is in need of amendment, because the first ex-
ample that it gives, murder, has been held by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals not to be a crime of degree."' In fact, the court has even held that
the crime of assault with intent to murder with malice does not include as
a lesser offense assault with intent to murder without malice."' These deci-
sions violate the plain language of the first two sections of article 37.09. If
the statute is to be amended, it should set forth some guidelines to assist
lawyers in determining which crimes include lesser offenses. Apparently,
the rule now is that if the crime is not specifically listed in the statute, there
can be a conviction for a lesser offense only if its every constituent element
is charged in the major offense and there is no repugnancy of elements.'
Once a decision is made as to which lesser offenses are included in a crime,
a joint construction of article 28.13 and article 37.14 places the law of
Texas in this position: (1) if prosecution is brought upon a complaint, a
judgment of acquittal or conviction does not bar further prosecution for a
higher offense;' 9 (2) if prosecution is brought upon an information or
indictment, a judgment of acquittal or conviction bars further prosecution
114TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09 (1965):
The following offenses include different degrees:
1. Murder, which includes all the lesser degrees of culpable homicide, and also an
assault with intent to commit murder;
2. An assault with intent to commit any felony, which includes all assaults of an
inferior degree;
3. Maiming, which includes aggravated and simple assault and battery;
4. Burglary, which includes every species of house breaking and theft or other felony
when charged in the indictment in connection with the burglary;
5. Riot, which includes unlawful assembly;
6. Kidnapping or abduction, which includes false imprisonment; and
7. Every offense against the person includes within it assaults with intent to commit
said offense, when such attempt is a violation of the law.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.14 (1965):
If a defendant, prosecuted for an offense which includes within it lesser offenses, be
convicted of an offense lower than that for which he is indicted, and a new trial
be granted him, or the judgment be arrested for any cause other than the want of
jurisdiction, the verdict upon the first trial shall be considered an acquittal of the
higher offense; but he may, upon a second trial, be convicted of the same offense
of which he was before convicted, or any other inferior thereto.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.13 (1965):
A former judgment of acquittal or conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction
shall be a bar to any further prosecution for the same offense, but shall not bar
a prosecution for any higher grade of offense over which said court had not
jurisdiction, unless such judgment was had upon indictment or information, in which
case the prosecution shall be barred for all grades of the offense.
115 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.08 (1966).
.. Beckham v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 438, 148 S.W.2d 1104 (1941); Chappell v. State, 124
Tex. Crim. 187, 61 S.W.2d 842 (1933); cf. Boyle v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 257, 162 S.W.2d 726
(1942).
"'Ex parte Byrd, 157 Tex. Crim. 595, 251 S.W.2d 537 (1952).
. Tomlin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 207, 233 S.W.2d 303 (1950). See also Van Arsdale v.
State, 149 Tex. Crim. 639, 198 S.W.2d 270 (1946); Booker v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 2, 127
S.W.2d 460 (1939).
"'See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 15.04, 15.05 (1966) for definition and description
of the accusatorial pleading known as "complaint."
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for all grades of included offenses."' Article 37.14 apparently creates one
exception to the above rules. If the prosecution is upon indictment and a
judgment of conviction is reversed, there may be further prosecution for
lower grades of the offense.'
This statutory hodgepodge is untenable. Potential for retrial of degrees
of offenses should not turn upon the type of accusatorial pleading used.
Instead, considerations of harm done to society and criminal intent should
control.'
V. CONCLUSION
If we are to avoid the present quagmire with respect to the law of mul-
tiple prosecution, a new approach appears necessary. Should we start anew,
we must constantly retain the notion that the purpose we are attempting
to achieve is that of a single punishment for a single crime. With this in
mind, considerations of limitation of a single crime to act, fact, definition,
intent, or whatever, may be made simpler and more uniform. It is equally
necessary that we appreciate that doctrines of res judicata, autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict, and carving are not so sacrosanct as to merit the puncti-
lious treatment we now afford them. They are, after all, merely tools to
reach our ultimate principle of a single punishment for a single crime. In
addition, we should realize that problems of repetitive sentencing and pre-
verdict trial termination have no place in the law of multiple prosecution.
"'Allen v. State, 389 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1965) (conviction of assault upon complaint filed
in justice of peace court does not bar further prosecution by indictment for robbery by assault);
Grisham v. State, 19 Tex. Crim. 504 (1885) (conviction for aggravated assault upon information
in county court does bar further prosecution by indictment for assault with intent to murder).
See also Foster v. State, 25 Tex. Crim. 543, 8 S.W. 664 (1888); Allen v. State, 7 Tex. Crim.
298 (1879). For definition of "information" and "indictment" see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN.
arts. 21.20, 21.21, 21.01, 21.02 (1966).
... This language in article 37.14, note 114 supra, is in apparent conflict with TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 41.05 (1965), which states: "The effect of arresting a judgment is to
place the defendant in the same position he was before the indictment or information was pre-
sented .... ." If the defendant is actually in the "same position" then seemingly he would be
amenable to prosecution for all grades of an offense.
122 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined
in Section 1.08 and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(a) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first pro-
ceeding; or
(b) any offense for which the defendant should have been tried on the first prose-
cution under Section 1.07, unless the Court ordered a separate trial of the charge
of such offense; or
(c) the same conduct, unless (i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted
each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining
each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or
evil, or (ii) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial
began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the information was filed or the
indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant
which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order
or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must
be established for conviction of the second offense.
(3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination
is defined in Section 1.08, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which
the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been im-
properly terminated.
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They are separate considerations and deal with issues obverse to the single
crime, single punishment axiom. They deserve a jurisprudence of their own
which allows for broader concern with issues outside the scope of the
single crime, single punishment idea.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court will bring a fresh insight to
multiple prosecution, should it decide to make the fifth amendment prohi-
bition applicable to the states. Considering the trend, there is every reason
to suspect that such will be the case. In the meantime, considerable im-
provement could be made in the approach to multiple prosecution in Texas
through the use of plenary legislative revision.
